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Abstract 
The processing ablity and response speed of the wireless communication terminals are limited, common signatures 
become the bottleneck to the development of the wireless networks. For that problem, based on the characteristics of 
the blind signature, the online/offline blind signature is given in this paper which incorporates with the optimal 
online/offline signature. Most computations are finished before the blind message is given, after that, only a few 
operations are needed. The performance analysis is also given in this paper, the new signature scheme can be applied 
to the security of wireless network, it protect the users’ privacy efficiently. 
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
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1 Introduction 
 Digital signature schemes play an important role in information security and have exhibited many 
applications. However, the computation of signature requires a private computer with a reasonable 
computation power. In practice, there could be a situation, where such a computer is not availabe. 
In order to further reduce the computational cost of signature generation, online/offline signature is 
preferable in wireless network. Even, Goldreich and Micali proposed a general method for converting any 
signature scheme into an online/offline signature scheme.The signature can divided into two parts which 
are the offline signatre and the online signatre. In the process of the offline signature, almost all of the 
calculations are done before the blind message is given. And in the following process of the online 
signature, only  small quantities of computations are needed after the blind message is available. However, 
the  method is impratical since it increases the size of the signature by a quadratic factor. Later, Shamire[1] 
proposed a new method called ‘hash-sign-swich’ for designing more efficient schemes.The calculation of 
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online phase is one tenth of the modular multiplication. The scheme can resist the chosen message attack 
but has a problem of the trapdoor leak. Chen[2] proposed a online/offline scheme with double trapdoor 
hash functions, which can solve the problem of trapdoor leak. Harm[3] introduce the trapdoor function of 
multi collision in online/offline signature which can sign a variety of message. Gao[4] proposed a scheme 
which can directly convert the trapdoor hash functions into online/offline signatures. The whole 
computation in Gao’s scheme is half of the computation in Shamir’s scheme. Girault proposed GPS 
scheme[5] in which the length of secret key is short and the operation in online phase is on the integers 
not the modular calculation, so its efficiency is more efficient than Shamir’s scheme. Chevallier-Mames 
and Joye respectly put forward their schemes in[6][7], which efficiency is the same to the GPS. Guo[8] 
proposed the optimal online/offline signature which is more efficient than GPS’s scheme. 
Blind signature[10][11][12] is a special digital signature for the signer doesn’t know the specific 
content of the document. The technology of blind signature has been used widely(e.g. the electronic 
voting system, electronic cash system, etc.). The blind signature was first proposed by Chaum ,which is to 
make the signature to sign for the blind messsage. The blind signature can protect the uers’ privacy for the 
signer doesn’t know the original message and the signer cannot link up the signature with the original 
message. 
Based on the opimal online/offline signature in Guo’s scheme,  a new scheme proposed in this paper 
which can convert  blind signature into online/offline blind signature that can effectly protect the users’ 
and the merchants’ privacy. 
 
2   Related works 
2.1 Bilinear Map 
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. A map e: G×G→GT is 
called a bilinear map if this map satisfies the following properties: 
(1) Bilinear: for all u, v∈G, a,b∈Zq , we have e(ua,vb)=e(u,v)ab. 
(2) Non-degeneracy: g is the generator of G, then ( , ) 1e g g ≠ . 
(3) Computability: It is efficient to compute e(u,v) for all ,u v G∈ . 
 
2.2 Blind message 
User dispose the original message M into   M called blind message and give it to the signer. For 
example, randomly choose an integer d,  set  M =dM, the integer d is called blind factor. As the signer 
does not know the blind factor, the message is blind to signer.  
 
2.3 basic online/offline signature 
Definiton 1: Guo proposed basic online/offline signature which based on Water’s scheme of 
signature[9].The security of Guo’s signature is attributed to the GDH problem. Here we call it on/offline-
w scheme which can be described as follows: 
Initialize: Run the system and output q,e,G,GT and bilinear map T: Ge G G× → ,  the prime order of G 
is q and the generator is g.  And u0, (u10,u11), (u20,u21), … , (un0,un1) are the other random generators. The 
public params are defined as the following tuple: 
params={e, q, G, GT, u0, (u10,u11), (u20,u21), … , (un0,un1)}. 
KeyGen: Randomly choose an integer qZβ∈ , and compute the secret key SK = gβ , the public key 
PK= ( , )e g gβ . 
2216  JIANG Hua and HU Ran-dong / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 2214 – 2218 Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 3
Sign: The signing is divided into the offline phase for pre-computation and the online phase . Compute 
most computations in offline phase and store the offline datas which are as the outputs of online phase. 
Offline phase: Signer input the secret key and params. 
(1)Randomly choose two n-length vectors (μ1,…, μn) and (ν1,…,νn), such that 
（μ1+…+ μn）=(ν1+…+νn)=1(mod q) 
(2)Randomly choose qr Z∈ ,  compute rgτ = and the following 2n values:  
0 1 0 0 0 1( , ) ( ( ) , ( )i i i i
r r
i i i is s g u u g u u
μ β ν μ β ν= , for i=1,2,…,n; 
    (3)Store the following 2n+1 elements: 
                                     w=((s10,s11),…,(si0,si1),τ) 
   Online phase:Given the message {0,1}nM ∈ , let M[i] be the ith bit of M, the signature is generated as 
follows: 
   (1)compute r r
[ ] 0 iM[i] 0 iM[i]1 1 1
( u ) g (u u )i i
nn n
iM i
i i
i
s s g u βμ β ν
= = =
= Π = Π = Π  
   (2)output the last signature (s,τ). 
Verify: input (M,s,τ), accept the signature if the following equation holds 
                       ( ) ( ) 0 iM[i]1e s,g e g ,  g e(u u , )
n
i
β
=
= Π τ  
3 Our scheme 
3.1 Model of the scheme 
Definitions 2: The model of our scheme contains the following several parts: Setup, KeyGen, Blind, Sign, 
Verify. Here the signature that we construct is called online/offline-b-s scheme which can be described as 
the following. 
Initialize:  Output public params. 
KeyGen:  Input public params, and output public key and the secret key. 
Blind:  User converts the original message M into the blind message  M and then transfer it to the signer. 
Sign: This algorithem is divided into two phases: 
Offline phase: Input the secret key and public params, output the offline-datas and strore them. 
Online phase: Input the blind message  M  and the datas in offline phase, after some simple 
computations, output the signature on the blind message. And the last signature is a set of the signature 
and some related coefficients. 
Verify: Input the original message M and the last signature, if the equation holds and then accept the 
signatue. 
 
3.2  Scheme construction 
Setup: run the system, h is a strong hash function without collision,  h: *{0,1} {0,1}nqZ× →  .G and GT 
are cyclic groups of prime order q,  g and u0 are the generators of G, randomly choose n different pairs of 
generators of G : (u10,u11),(u20,u21),…,(un0,un1). Output the public params: 
params={e,q,G,GT,g,u0,(u10,u11),…,(un0,un1)} 
KeyGen: Randomly choose integer qZβ∈ , compute the secret key gβ , and ( , )e g gβ as the public key. 
Blind: User randomly choose integer qd Z∈ , compute   ( , )M h M d= . 
Sign: The two phases are the offline phase and the online phase. 
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Offline phase: the blind message is not given. 
(1) Randomly choose two n-length vectors 1,..., )n qZ(μ μ ∈  and 1,..., )n qZ(ν ν ∈ ,such that 
1 1 ) 1(mod )n n q(μ + ...+ μ ) = (ν + ...+ ν =  
(2) Randomly integer qr Z∈ , compute rgτ =  and the other 2n values of offline phase 
0 1 0 0 0 1( , ) ( ( ) , ( ) )i i i i
v vr r
i i i is s g u u g u u
β βμ μ= , for i=1,2,…,n. 
(3) Store the offline-datas w=((s10,s11),…,(sn0,sn1), τ) 
 
Online phase: after the blind message  M is given,   {0,1}nM ∈ ,   [ ]M i  is the ith bit of  M . 
(1) In accordance with   [ ]M i , choose   [ ]iM is  from w, and then compute signature   [ ]1
n
i M ii
s s
=
= Π  
(2) Output the last signature (M,τ,d,s). 
 
Verify: Input (M,τ,d,s), and check the equation. 
(1) Compute 0 ( , ),M h M d= 0[ ]M i  is the ith bit of 0M . 
(2) Accept the signature if the equation holds: ( ) ( ) [ ]00 iM i1e s,g e g ,  g e(u u , )
n
i
β τ
=
= Π   
 
4  Performance analysis and application 
4.1 Performance analysis 
Blind: The message that signer receives is the blind message  M not the original message M, so the 
message is blind to him.  It is impossible to regain the original message M from the blind message  M for 
  ( , )M h M d= , and  not only the blind factor d is unknown to the signer but also the hash function is 
irreversible. Even if the original message M is published, the signer cannot make association with M and 
 M , and then cannot make association the signature with M. 
 
Verifiability: Given the message M and (τ,d,s), and compute e(s,g) whose expansions are as  the 
following: 
   
 
   
   
1 n 1 n
r
0[ ] [ ]1 1
(  ) ( ) r
0 [ ]1
r r
0 0[ ] [ ]1 1
0 0[ ] [ ]1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( ( ) , )
( (u ) , )
( (u ) , ) ( , ) ((u ) , )
( , ) (u , ) ( , ) (u , )
i i
n n
i M i i M ii i
n
i M ii
n n
i M i i M ii i
n n
r
i M i i M ii i
e s g e s g e g u u g
e g u g
e g u g e g g e u g
e g g e u g e g g e u
β
μ μ β ν ν
β β
β β
μ ν
= =
+…+ +…+
=
= =
= =
= Π = Π
= Π
= Π = Π
= Π = Π τ
 
after neaten the expansions, we get  that: ( )  0 [ ]1e s,g ( , ) (u , )
n
iM ii
e g g e uβ
=
= Π τ .  
Compute 0 ( , )M h M d= , if the signature is effective, 0M and  M  are same, the M[i] and 0[ ]M i are 
same.  Then we have the following equation: 
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  [ ]00 0  i[ ]1 1( , ) ( , ) (u , ) ( , ) (u , )
n n
i MiM ii i
e s g e g g e u e g g e uβ β
= =
= Π τ = Π τ  
 
4.2 Efficiency and application 
In our online/offline-b-s scheme, as most computations have been done in offline phase, so we only 
analysis the efficiency in online phase. Different from other online/offline signatures, the computation is 
only the simple multiplication not the exponentiation. 
Our online/offline-b-s can be applied to the wireless network with that the computational capabilities 
are limited, the scheme can effectively solve the drawback of the wireless terminals in communication. In 
the offline phase, the computations are done on the terminals with strong processing capacity or in the 
time when the terminals are vacant. Only a few  simple computations are needed after message is given. 
And online/offline-b-s is also a kind of blind signature, the signer cannot know the content in ocument, so 
the secret information is protected, for which  reason the scheme can applied to the Wireless Mobile 
Internet(e.g. the wireless e-voting system and e-cash system,etc.). 
 
5 Conclusion 
    The online/offline-b-s is high-efficiency, and the essence of blind signature is that the signer doesn’t 
know the original content of the message. In the fields where the time of message-signing is limited and 
the computational capability is weak(e.g. wireless sensor network), the scheme is practicable. The future 
work is to design more secure and more efficient online/offline signature.   
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